Filed under: Adorno, Benjamin, Freud, Nietzsche, Sedgwick, Soviet Union, fascism, feminism, gay rights, heteronormativity, homosexuality, philosophy, queer, sexuality
I’ve been meaning to write this for a while, and have decided that maybe it was time to really articulate my thoughts on why I really, really hate Adorno’s work. It had something to do with his posturing toward homosexuality, and something to do with what I sensed as a certain kind of awful elitism. It is also connected with the alarming number of gay Adorno fanboy apologists I’ve run into over the last while. So I went to the library and picked up Minima Moralia, which I hadn’t actually read before (and still haven’t gotten far into).The opening line of the dedication reads :
The melancholy science from which I make this offering to my friend relates to a region that from time immemorial was regarded as the true field of philosophy, but which, since the latter’s conversion into method, has lapsed into intellectual neglect, sententious whimsy and finally oblivion: the teaching of the good life.
An astute student or, I guess, professor maybe, who wrote all over the library’s copy of this book (I actually often enjoy what other people write in books) had written, in pencil, above the word ‘melancholy’, gay. And of course, yes: In this first sentence of a dedication, Adorno takes a stance toward Nietzsche. His “melancholy science” (die traurige Wissenschaft) is in direct opposition to Nietzsche’s gay science (die fröliche Wissenschaft). Of course Adorno isn’t articulating a simple opposition here – both Adorno and Nietzsche are engaged in similar projects, “the teaching of the good life”. Rather, for Adorno, something fundamental about the world had changed since Nietzsche: Fascism had reared its artificially beblondened head.
Rather than focus directly on fascism here, though, I’d like to spend some time articulating that astute student’s one-word note: gay. As Kauffmann notes in his introduction to The Gay Science, it is “no accident that the homosexuals as well as Nietzsche opted for ‘gay’ rather than ‘cheerful’” because it “has overtones of a light-hearted defiance of convention; it suggests Nietzsche’s ‘immoralism’ and his ‘revaluation of values.’” Gay, then, I think forms one axis of a possible analysis of Adorno’s work, which lays out vertically as an opposition between Nietzsche’s joyful, light-hearted revaluation of all values and Adorno’s “melancholy science”, and horizontally as an opposition between homosexuality in its Western, twentieth-century guise with its light-hearted defiance of conventions, on the one hand, and heterosexuality and the status quo on the other.
Adorno is – the astute student was correct – gay. Where Nietzsche took to delight, Adorno took to despair. Where Nietzsche undermined, Adorno reinforced. One of the things that bugs me about Adorno, which I think this introductory sentence makes clear, is that Adorno is not aiming at a Nietzschean revaluation of all values, not even the values of those systems that he claimed so ardently to oppose. His melancholy science is one for the perpetuation of a system of values – which could be defined in several ways (Adorno’s own, fascist, bourgeois, anti-working-class, racist, homophobic) – that already exist in the world. Where Nietzsche looked (or at least claimed to look) forward, Adorno looked back.
Though it certainly isn’t clear that Adorno looked to the golden past with an eye toward a return – he didn’t seem to think such a return was possible – it was nevertheless in the past that “technical virtuosity, at least, was demanded of singing stars”, that melody had not come “to mean eight-beat symmetrical treble melody”, that there was at least a difference in terms of reaction to Beethoven’s Seventh Symphony and a bikini. The past, on Adorno’s analysis, was one in which fetishism had not yet come to dominate the musical (and, indeed, cultural) scene.
It is at the site of the fetish where Adorno most strongly attempts to rhetorically establish links between homosexuality, or sexual deviance more generally, and fascism. Musical fascism, one can only surmise given Adorno’s peculiar language, becomes embodied as the homosexual rapist. As the first part of a key to Adorno’s aggressively homophobic rhetorical construction here, I will turn to Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age of its Technical Reproducibility”, a work which Adorno openly stated radically influenced his “On the Fetish-Character in Music and the Regression of Listening”. Benjamin, late in the essay, announces that “The violation of the masses, whom Fascism, with its Führer cult, forces to their knees, has its counterpart in the violation of an apparatus which is pressed into the production of ritual values.” This apparatus (camera or phallus?), which artificially reproduces a process that has at least come to be natural to humankind, now (re)produces reality, substituting “a space consciously explored by man” with “an unconsciously penetrated space”, opening up “a different nature”, the process of which can, apparently, only mimic that “violation of the masses” at the hand of the Führer.
Adorno puts it more clearly: “Totalitarianism and homosexuality belong together.” Gorky had already stated it yet more clearly in 1934:
In the land where the proletariat governs courageously and successfully, homosexuality, with its corrupting effect on the young, is considered a social crime punishable under the law. By contrast, in the “cultivated land” of the great philosophers, scholars and musicians, it is practiced freely and with impunity. There is already a sarcastic saying: “Destroy homosexuality and fascism will disappear.”
Marxism, in this mode of analysis, acts as the cure for both homosexuality and for fascism. For Gorky, this was no doubt due to a presumed direct relationship between the means of production and the superstructural effect of sexual expression. For Adorno, the mysterious relationship between fascism and homosexuality expressed the structure of much, if not all, of contemporary society. Despite his near-continual analyses of this or that phenomenon as homosexual/fascist, Adorno never quite gets to analyzing this relationship (he would later, possibly having developed a more sympathetic eye toward gay men and women, analyze this relationship in terms of repressed homosexuality (and, as the old chestnut goes, necessarily homophobia) and tendencies toward fascism, but as far as I can tell this is a turn for Adorno, something new). Benjamin, though, is fairly more explicit: In a discussion of Futurism, he suggests that “[i]f the natural utilization of productive forces is impeded by the property system, the increase in technical devices, in speed, and in the sources of energy will press for an unnatural utilization, and this is found in war. … Instead of draining rivers, society directs a human stream into a bed of trenches; instead of dropping seeds from airplanes, it drops incendiary bombs over citites; and through gas warfare the aura is abolished in a new way.” There is, here, a “natural utilization” for “productive forces” (and, I suggest, Benjamin was saying that this was true for all (re)productive forces) which, could be, in unnatural circumstances, pressed “for an unnatural utilization”. The words “human stream”, “bed of trenches”, “seeds”, “bombs” underline the stakes here: This is a life or death struggle. Not simply a struggle against the forces of death, but a choice between life – the “human stream” or “seeds” (that is, semen) – or death, first in the form of an unnatural destination for the “human stream”, and second as an unnatural replacement of that “seed” being “dropped” with “bombs”.
This theme, first mobilized around the cluster of homosexuality and fascism and, now, the military, and second around the axis of life/death is repeated in Adorno’s Minima Morlia, in the section titled “Tough Baby”. The argument developed here, one I myself saw repeated many times while in high school, takes the form “I’m not the fag, you are!” Adorno, apparently upset that intellectuals – and he seemed to value intellectuals as the only possible saviors for humankind – were viewed as effeminate, analyzes the cigarette-smoking, whisky-drinking “tough guy” image in terms of a presumed masochism and hidden homosexuality (like fascism and homosexuality, intimately and mysteriously connected). Adorno, the intellectual, is gay. It is, rather, the masochistic tough guy who is “revealed” to have homosexual impulses. Adorno, the anti-Nietzsche, is also gay. It is, here, the “tough guy” who attempts a nearly Nietzschean mastery of the body, of which Adorno is maybe (or likely) jealous.
Here is the cluster Adorno has, with the help of Benjamin, developed so far: homosexuality, fascism, masculinity (to which Adorno opposed a “true” – his – masculinity), the military, war, death. It is with the fetish (which, as with Adorno’s brand of theory itself, is both Freudian and Marxist, both sexual and economic) that pop culture, and with it all culture, gets thrown in the mix. In “On the Fetish-Character in Music”, Adorno introduces a cast of characters: the “radio ham”, who “is shy and inhibited, perhaps has no luck with girls”, “‘occupies’ himself with music in the quiet of his bedroom” and “insert[s] himself, with his private equipment, into the public mechanism”; the “listening expert” who, like a secret masturbator, “must practice the piano for hours in secret” “in nimble subordination to what the instrument demands of him”, in “agreement with everything dominant”, and “produc[ing] no resistance” to the demands of authority; and, finally, the jitterbugg(er)er, the “infantile listener” (the influence of Freudian theory of homosexuality, that homosexuality is the result of a failure to develop properly, is a clear mark here) whose “ecstasy”, which “takes possession of its object”, “is without content”, who imitate “the gestures of the sensual”, “copy[ing] the stages of sexual excitement only to make fun of them”. The imitation here, of “true” (heterosexual) sensuality, maps both onto “false” (homosexual) imitations of sensuality and the false imitations of sensuality produced via the jitterbug. The result is the production of “the masses”, almost always in Adorno accompanied by the adjective “passive”, who, as mentioned earlier, according to Benjamin, await their “violation” at the hands of the Führer.
Assuming for a minute that I’m right here, that Adorno’s analysis is motivated by a peculiar homophobia, a fear of the Führer-rapist’s sodomizing authority, so what? Why care? Other than the fun of queering texts, why bother?
- Adorno in particular continues to be wildly influential in cultural theory.
- The presumed connection between homosexuality and fascism, despite fascist atrocities against gay people, gay men particularly, continues to this day. McCarthy, during a period where Soviet communism was presumably nearly identical with fascism in the United States, made this connection both openly and clearly when he said, “If you want to be against McCarthy, boys, you’ve got to be a Communist or a cocksucker.” This certainly isn’t new to Adorno (Adorno wasn’t an original thinker, I think, though he was a brilliant synthesizer), and certainly not peculiar to Adorno. Indeed, it is most readily found in fairly recent feminist theory, as Eve Sedgwick points out in her book Tendencies.
- To me at least, it is disturbing that, despite his openly antagonistic stance toward homosexuality (don’t forget, “Totalitarianism and homosexuality belong together.”), Adorno’s theory remains fairly popular among gay men. While this is understandable – anyone who grew up gay in the high schools of the 1990s would likely sympathize with Adorno’s outsider position with respect to contemporary culture, as well as have an affinity with his fantasy of the tough-guy-as-closet-homosexual – it is also deeply disturbing.
Quoted in April Wilson’s German Quickly:
According to April Wilson, according to Heinrich Heine: “Die Lebensgeschichte Immanuel Kants ist schwere zu beschreiben. Denn er hatte weder Leben noch Geschichte.”
According to me, according to April Wilson, according to Heinrich Heine: “The life story of Immaneul Kant is difficult to describe. This is because he had neither life nor story.”
While we were reading Derrida’s Spurs (where, incidentally, Derrida briefly seems to take Wittgenstein’s private language argument as obviously correct), Chris pointed out a sort of theme that comes up in both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. Is there something to make of this? Some connection that could help us make sense of the world? Some deep rift between the analytic and continental traditions finally, and here, smoothed over? Probably not. But maybe, some German Sprichwort about old women who misplace or hide objects and then doubt their reality?
Nietzsche (quoted from Spurs):
I fear that women who have grown old are more sceptical in the secret recesses of their hearts than any of the men; they believe in the superficiality of existence as in its essence, and all virtue and profundity is to them only the disguising of this ‘truth’, the very desirable disguising of a pudendum – an affair, therefore, of decency and modesty, and nothing more!
Wittgenstein (from On Certainty):
I do philosophy now like an old woman who is always mislaying something and having to look for it again: now her spectacles, now her keys.
But then again, how does Wittgenstein do philosophy? Does he believe in “the superficiality of existence as in its essence”? That “truth” is “an affair … of decency and modesty, and nothing more”? My first stab is no, he doesn’t even commit to that. But if we step away from ‘truth’ and toward ‘essence’, then maybe Wittgenstein does have something in common with Nietzsche’s old lady.
The beginning of Wittgenstein’s critique of essences, from Philosophical Investigations:
‘The essence is hidden from us’: this is the form our problem now assumes. We ask: ‘What is language?’, ‘What is a proposition?’ And the answer to these questions is to be given once and for all, and independently of any future experience.
Finally, while surely this is one step too far, here’s Kharms again:
One old woman, due to her immoderate curiosity, tumbled out of a window and fell, killed in the collision.
So the pieces are: old ladies are skeptics, Wittgenstein does philosophy like an old lady, and curiosity killed the old lady.
I know, I know. Frege is boring. Or, at least, he’s boring until you catch his weird exclamation marks. Here are a couple, from “On Sense and Nominatum”:
- “Is this thought to be regarded as the sense or the nominatum of the sentence? Let us for the moment assume that the sentence has a nominatum!”
- “We may hope we have considered the simple types of sentences. Let us now review what we have found out!”
To me, the exclamation mark is most commonly a contraction for “. Yay!” So, “Kitties!” gets read by me “Kitties. Yay!” After that comes the “HEY LOOK AT ME” usage. So “Danger!” gets read “Danger HEY LOOK AT ME”. And I’m sure there are others, probably pretty similar.
The only point here is that I’m not sure why Frege (or his translator?) is using these exclamation marks. Here are some possibilities:
- They tend to occur at the end of sentences beginning with “Let us…” Maybe he wants his reader to get excited about what Frege wants the two of them to do together.
- Maybe Frege gets excited about assumptions and reviews, much like my “. Yay!”
Or, maybe I’m just too tired to be reading Frege right now. Sigh.
After reading this article, I was fairly struck by how the researcher was facing some of the same problems with which philosophers have had to deal for the past 300 years or so, and how their solutions could be informed by philosophy.
Anyone who has poked around here probably knows that I hate Kant, but there are interesting parallels to the problems Kant faced and one of the problems faced by AI researchers concerned with embodied AI: How the AI perceives the world. Kant argued that we don’t actually see the world as it is, that such things as space, time, and causation are not in the world so much as they are imposed on the world by our minds. One lesson to take from that, if you buy this story, is that the representation of the world that we make to ourselves has no necessary relationship to the world as it actually is. The lesson for AI (which it seems AI researchers are already well aware of): An embodied AI does not need to perceive (where ‘perceive’ should be taken to indicate any structure that represents the world, whether mathematical, spatial, geometrical, or even in terms of semantics) the world as it actually is (or even as we perceive it), but in whatever way facilitates its accomplishing of its goals.
I thought I hated Kant before. But now I’ve picked up a copy of The Metaphysics of Morals (which, by the way, has all these weird numbers all over it – there are page numbers, section numbers, paragraphish numbers – it’s very weird). Now I hate Kant more. Here’s why:
1. OMG WTF with the Awake magazine-like titles? “In a State of Nature Something External Can Actually Be Mine or Yours but Only Provisionally”? Really?
2. Stupid questions: “What is money?”, “What is a book?” (the answer literally opens with “A book is a writing…” and is quickly followed with another JW-ish title: “Unauthorized Publishing of Books Is Forbidden as a Matter of Right”. Kant should so work for the RIAA)
3. “Section III: On Rights to Persons Akin to Rights to Things”, which details all the ways, despite Kant’s dictum that a person should never be treated as a thing, that we can treat persons like things. I knew I would love this section once he started talking about sex, which is at the very beginning: “Sexual union is the reciprocal use that one human being makes of the sexual organs and capacities of another. This is either a natural use (by which procreation of a being of the same kind is possible) or an unnatural use, and unnatural use takes place either with a person of the same sex or with an animal of a nonhuman species.”
Note for the future:
So here’s the deal. I got in a lot of women’s studies classes on the one hand, and in a sort of skepticalish sense in a class on Foucault on the other, that he’s (maybe?) got this picture of reality he’s trying to get across in, say, The Order of Things that all of reality is somehow socially constructed, that we somehow collectively construct the stuff we see and study. I’m not sure I buy that, even if that’s the sort of thing that he was trying to do.
But I think it might not be. Maybe Foucault wasn’t so much into telling the truth about the world as he was into showing that a certain way of looking at the world just can’t possibly be true. Here’s my reconstruction:
Modern era: “Man constructs all of his experience WITH HIS MIND! Maybe there’s even Platonic forms!”
Foucault: “Do you even know where you came from? Because here’s the thing: Before you, people thought very differently about things. Isn’t that weird? And after you, they’ll probably think differently about things.”
Modern era: “WTF SRSLY?!”
Foucault: “No, really. And here’s the thing: This whole ‘man constructs all of his experience WITH HIS MIND’ whatnot isn’t only kind of embarrassing. Its also problematic.”
Modern era: “But it sounds so COOL! Also, PLATONIC FORMS!”
Foucault: “No it does sound cool, but if man constructs all of his experience with his mind, and part of man’s experience is man, then doesn’t man construct man WITH HIS MIND?“
Modern era: “OMGWTF BWAAAAAAA!”
Foucault: “Yeah, seriously.”
Did you catch the magic move there? The whole episteme talk that makes it so there can be a way of thinking before the modern era, and a way of thinking after the modern era, is kind of a version of “MAN CONSTRUCTS ALL OF HIS EXPERIENCE WITH HIS MIND!!!” Its using the rules of the Modern era that Foucault is able to pull together his claim that the Modern way of thinking self-destructs, and is therefore, I think he hopes, able to inaugurate a new way of thinking. What he doesn’t seem to be interested in doing there, though, is telling the truth, except insofar as “OMG contradiction!” is a truth. That is, you don’t play using a set of rules you think are flawed if what you want is to get at REAL REALITY. You only play with a set of rules that you think are flawed if you want to make sure the people who like those rules aren’t going to cry foul.
I just watched Stranger than Fiction, a really bizarre romantic comedy starring Will Ferrell, Queen Latifah, Maggie Gyllenhaal, Emma Thompson, and Dustin Hoffman where Will Ferrell’s character discovers that he’s a character in a book that Emma Thompson is writing and that as she writes her book, his destiny is also written. When he learns that Thompson is planning to kill him off, Ferrell confronts her, she gives him a copy of her manuscript, and he in turn gives it to Hoffman, who plays a professor of literature. One of the stranger elements of the film appears when Hoffman insists that Thompson’s book is a masterpiece and tries to convince Ferrell to let her finish the book as she intends to, which would result in Ferrell’s death, thereby transforming Ferrell’s life from meaninglessness as an IRS agent to an embodiment of (Greek) tragedy. Although this theme isn’t explicitly described in the film as Nietzschean, it nonetheless sounds a criticism of the philosophy for life Nietzsche builds in The Birth of Tragedy:
The metaphysical joy in the tragic is a translation of the instinctively unconscious Dionysian wisdom into the language of images: the hero, the greatest phenomenon of the will, is negated for our pleasure, because he remains only phenomenon and the eternal life of the will remains untouched by his annihilation. ‘We believe in eternal life’, such is the cry of the tragedy; while music is the unmediated idea of this life.
Compare this to Hoffman’s injunction to Ferrell that he let Thompson kill him off so that his life can be invested with meaning and he can live on forever through literature. Ferrel reads Thompson’s book and comes to the conclusion that her creation is better for his death, and here again he appears as the figure of the tragic hero who, reminding “us of another being and of a higher joy for which with a sense of foreboding … prepares himself through his destruction rather than through his triumphs.” He offers his life to her in sacrifice for her art.
Until she was confronted with Ferrell, Thompson also embodied Nietzsche’s ideal of the tragic artist who “shares with the Appolonian sphere of art the full pleasure in appearance and in seeing, and at the same time … negates this pleasure and takes an even higher satisfaction in the annihilation of the visible world of appearance.” This game of pleasure in appearance and its negation breaks, however, when Thompson realizes at least one of her characters (and perhaps all of them) is real, that in killing them off (which she does in all her books), she is not destroying mere appearance but actual people, and here the film confronts Nietzschean ideology full on.
Nietzsche wanted us to adopt the life of the tragic hero as our own, to actually live as if our lives were Greek tragedy. The film explicitly rejects this ideology, however, when it portrays Thompson’s character as deeply disturbed by her game of appearances become reality, when she is unable to complete her book as intended after she realizes that doing so would result in actual death. She doesn’t, in the end, really believe in the tragedy she writes, because she can’t bring herself, given the opportunity, to make it reality. The tragic life, the film’s writer seems to want to say, looks fine on paper, but as a life lived is bunk.
Hoffman’s character expresses the view that literature can be divided into two types: tragedy and comedy, where tragedy embodies the Nietzschean ideal and comedy in terms of contemporary genres most closely resembles the romantic comedy. The film never strays from this characterization, and insofar as life resembles literature (an at least implicit, if not in-your-face explicit theme adopted by the film), therefore leaves us two models for the good life: tragedy or comedy.
Since it rejects tragedy, though, the film offers us only one option around which to structure our lives: Romantic comedy.
In the preface to The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, Foucault has some interesting things to say about lists:
[I]t is not simply the oddity of unusual juxtapositions that we are faced with here. We are all familiar with the disconcerting effect of the proximity of extremes, or, quite simply, with the sudden vicinity of things that have no relation to each other; the mere act of enumeration that heaps them all together has a power of enchantment all its own: ‘I am no longer hungry,’ Eusthenes said. ‘until the morrow, safe from my saliva all the following shall be: Aspics, Acalephs, Acanthocephalates, Amoebocytes, Ammonites, Axolotls, Amblystomas, Aphilisions, Anacondas, Ascarids, Amphisbaenas, Angleworms, Amphipods, Anaerobes, Annelids, Anthozoans….’ But all these worms and snakes, all these creatures redolent of decay and slime are slithering, like the syllables which designate them, in Eusthenes’ saliva: that is where they all have their common locus, like the umbrella and the sewing machine on the operating table; startling though their propinquity may be, it is nevertheless warranted by that and, by that in, by that on whose solidity provides proof of the possibility of juxtaposition. It was certainly improbably that arachnids, ammonites, and annelids should one day mingle on Eusthenes’ tongue, but, after all, that welcoming and voracious mouth certainly provided them with a feasible lodging, a roof under which to coexist.
And that is one of the powers of lists: They provide that common locus and do the work of making the dissimilar similar; they glue things together into enormously complex structures in which we find meaning and utility. In fact, suppose I were to make a list of things that were dissimilar: cats, laundry baskets, water, sunlight. These dissimilar things, in the context of my list become similar through their very dissimilarity. We can begin to see in them the similarities we started by denying. We can even create a narrative through which these objects become similar above and beyond their dissimilarity, pushed along by the montage of things merely in proximity.
Now look back on Aldiss’ lists: The dissimilar things on the shelves become similar through their placement on those shelves and on the page. The things themselves and their proximity tell a story above and beyond what Aldiss is willing to come out and say. And their contrasts further that story: Why would S have a copy of ‘Pregnancy–Conception To Childbirth’ and an issue of ‘Boy’s Own Paper’? Why an oily rag and a chair leg? Aldiss doesn’t give any clues, beyond what the other characters in the book do with this information. These characters are in the same position as the reader – their task, and the reader’s, is to decipher the meanings of these lists.
I hate Kant. Maybe that’s putting things too strongly. Maybe not. No, not. Kant was wrong. About everything. Kant makes me more cranky, the more I read of him. Kant did important (or important-sounding) things for unimportant reasons. Kant was shallow, and sounded deep. Everything Kant said was either obvious or obviously wrong. Kant used big words where he could have used small words. Kant was not stylin’. Kant was what is wrong with modernity. I can’t read Kant. Kant thought homosexuality violated Kant’s categorical imperative (but not for the reasons you might think he thought that). Kant used radical philosophy to maintian the status quo. Kant changed his name from ‘Emanuel’ to ‘Immanuel’. Kant worked hard. Kant agreed with Hitler (or Hitler agreed with Kant). Kant never married. Kant’s givens are not my givens. Kant hid things so that he could keep them. Kant supported racial (racist) heirarchies. Kant was not a clock. Kant probably ate alone.